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AGAINST AN ACTIVIST COURT*
Raoul Berger**

"The real issue," Professor Willard Hurst stated in 1954, "is who [is to
make] the policy choices in the twentieth century: judges or the combination of legislature and electorate that makes constitutional amendments."'
The thesis of this paper is that the judiciary is not empowered to supplant
the policy choices of the framers with its own. One example suffices to
show that it has done so. With the "one person-one vote" doctrine,2 the
Supreme Court reversed the unmistakable intention of the fourteenth
amendment's framers to exclude suffrage from its scope. Justice Harlan
affirmed that this doctrine truly flew "in the face of irrefutable and still
unanswered history to the contrary."3 An activist, Professor Louis Lusky
of Columbia University, wrote that Harlan's demonstration is "irrefutable
and unrefuted";4 half-a-dozen activist academicians agree.5
Let me summarize the veriest nutshell of the confirmatory facts. Justice
Brennan, himself a perfervid activist, observed that "17 of 19" northern
states had rejected black suffrage between 1865 and 1868.6 Consequently,
Roscoe Conkling, a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
which drafted the fourteenth amendment, stated that it would be "futile to
* Originally presented at the American Bar Association "Conference on the Role of
the Judge in the '80s," June 19-20, 1981, in Washington, D.C. For the reader's convenience,
annotations have been supplied by the staff of the Catholic University Law Review.
** A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M.
1938, Harvard University; LL.D. 1978, University of Michigan.
1. Discussion following Curtis, The Role of the Constitutional Text, in SUPREME
COURT AND SUPREME LAW

75 (E. Cahn ed. 1954).

2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-9
(1964).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).

4. Lusky, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS

CONST.

L.Q. 403, 406 (1979).

5. See, e.g., Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change.: Another
Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 603, 622 (1978); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204, 234 n. 115 (1980); Abraham, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467,
468 (1979); Mendelson, Book Review, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 452-53 (1979); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
685, 687 (1978).
6. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 256 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ask three quarters of the States to do. . .the very thing most of them have
already refused to do."' 7 Another member of the committee, Senator Jacob
Howard, made a similar statement. 8 The chairman of the committee, Senator William Fessenden, said, of a suffrage proposal, that there is not "the
slightest probability that it will be adopted by the States." 9 The unanimous
report of the committee doubted that "the States would consent to surrender a power they had exercised, and to which they were attached," and
therefore thought it best to "leave the whole question with the people of
each State."' 10 That such was the vastly-preponderant opinion in the debates is confirmed by a remarkable fact. During the pendency of ratification, radical opposition to readmission of Tennessee, because its
constitution excluded Negro suffrage, was voted down in the House by 125
to 12.1 Senator Charles Sumner's parallel proposal was rejected by a vote
of 34 to 4.12 Thus, the evidence indicates that even the radicals did not
believe that suffrage was covered by the fourteenth amendment. Hence,
the fifteenth amendment was adopted-as its framers expressly stated--to
fill the gap left by the failure of the fourteenth to provide for Negro suffrage. Summing up, former Solicitor General Robert Bork stated that
"[tjhe principle of one man one vote. . . runs counter to the text of the
fourteenth amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and ratification and the political practice of Americans from colonial times up to the
day the Court invented the new formula."' 3
Before showing that no such power to reverse the framers was given to
the Court, let me recall some basic principles. Chief Justice Marshall declared, in Marbury v. Madison,l that a written constitution was designed
to define and limit power and asked: "To what purpose are powers limited
• . .if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained,"' 5 among whom he included the courts. In addition, there is
the founders' attachment to a "fixed" Constitution, expressed by Justice
William Paterson, one of the foremost framers: "The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people. . . and can be
7. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
8. Id at 2766.
9. Id at 704.
10. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. xiii
(1866), quotedin R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 84 (1977).
11. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3980 (1866).
12. Id at 4000.
13. Bork, Neutral Princoles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 18
(1971).

14. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
15. Id at 176.
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revoked or altered only by the authority that made it."' 6 Another influential framer, Elbridge Gerry, emphasized that the people provided for a
particular mode of making amendments, which "we are not at liberty to
depart from ... ."7 Until the people have changed the Constitution by
amendment, Alexander Hamilton assured the ratifiers, "it is binding...
and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant
their representatives in a departure from it."" s Little wonder that Marshall
explicitly disclaimed a judicial "right to change [the] instrument." 19
What role did the framers assign to the judiciary? The Constitution
makes no specific provision for judicial review. The Founders were fearful
of the greedy expansiveness of power; they dreaded that their delegates
might "overleap" their bounds.2" Hence, as James Bradley Thayer and
Judge Learned Hand noted, they empowered the courts to police those
boundaries.2 The limited nature of that role was underscored by Justice
James Iredell, who had anticipated Hamilton's defense of judicial review.
Referring to constitutional limits on legislative power, Justice Iredell
declared:
Beyond these limitations. . . their acts are void, because they are
not warranted by the authority given. But within them . . . the
Legislatures only exercise a discretion expressly confided to them
by the constitution . . . . It is a discretion no more controlable
[sic] . . . by a Court . . . than a judicial determination is by
them.22
Hamilton was constrained to assure the nervous ratifiers that, of the three
branches, the judiciary was "next to nothing, ' 23 that the courts may not
"on the pretense of a repugnancy. . . substitute their own pleasure to [sic]
the constitutional intentions of the legislature. ' 24 He stressed that judges
would be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the
legislature. ' 25 He would have been aghast to learn that judges may substitute their own pleasure for the unmistakable intention of the framers.
16. Van Home's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 304, 308 (1795).
17. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 503 (1789).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (Heritage Press ed. 1945).
19. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.

1969).
20. 4 J.

ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 196, 445 (2d ed. 1836).

21, Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 135 (1893); L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 31, 66 (1962).

22. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 199, 266 (1796) (emphasis added).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 n.* (A. Hamilton) (Heritage Press ed. 1945).
24. Id at 524.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 544 (A. Hamilton) (Heritage Press ed. 1945).
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Judicial participation in legislative policymaking was categorically rejected. It had been proposed to make the Justices members of a Council of
Revision that would assist the President in exercising the veto power, on
the ground that "[laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous,
may be destructive and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the
Judges in refusing to give them effect." 26 Mark the distinction, later re2 7
peated by Marshall: an unwise law is not necessarily unconstitutional.
But Elbridge Gerry objected, stating that "[ilt was quite foreign from the
nature of ye office to make them judges of the policy of public measures." 2 8 Nathaniel Gorham chimed in that judges "are not to be presumed
to possess a peculiar knowledge of. . .public measures."29 Rufus King
added that judges ought not to be legislators for they "ought to be able to
expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation." 3 This, Edward Corwin commented, was
"the first important step in the clarification of the Convention's ideas with
reference to the doctrine of judicial review," the "rejection of the Council
of Revision idea on the basis of the principle. .. 'that the power of making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding the laws."' 3 The
pervasiveness of this view is attested by Judge Henry's statement in
KamPer v. Hawkins,32 a landmark assertion of the power of judicial
review:
The judiciary from the nature of the office . . .could never be
designed to determine upon the equity, necessity or usefulness of
a law; that would amount to an express interference with the legislative branch. . . .Not being chosen immediately by the people, nor being accountable to them . . . they do not, and ought
not, to represent the people in framing or repealing any law.33
Given that suffrage was unmistakably excluded from the fourteenth
26. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (rev.
ed. 1937) (statement of James Wilson). This proposal was also supported by James Madison
but was ultimately rejected. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 300-06 (1977).
27. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 190-91 (G. Gunther
ed. 1969). Justice Holmes has also added that "[t]he criterion of constitutionality is not
whether we believe the law to be for the public good." Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S 525, 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 97-98
(rev. ed. 1937).
29. 2 id at 73.
30. 1 id at 98.
31. E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: ITS LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BASES 42 (1914).
32. 3 Va. (I Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
33. Id at 47.
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amendment, it is therefore not for the Court to assert jurisdiction over state
voting practices in the interest of a higher political morality.
Those who rejoice in what Lusky describes as the Court's "assertion of
the power to revise the Constitution, bypassing the cumbersome amendment procedure prescribed by article V,"'34 rely on the choice by the framers of the fourteenth amendment of allegedly "open-ended"" terms, what
Professor John Hart Ely labels an "invitation" to import extra-constitutional values.36 Professor Ely agrees, however, that "due process" had a
fixed procedural content. 37 Support for this interpretation is provided by
Hamilton's statement, made on the eve of the convention, summarizing
400 years of English and Colonial history:3 8 "The words 'due process' have
a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts at justice; they can never be referred to as an act of
[the] legislature. '39 The Reconstruction debates disclose that this was the
thinking of the framers of the several amendments.4°
Ely himself labels the "privileges and immunities" clause as "quite inscrutable," and the "equal protection" clause as "also unforthcoming. ' '4 1
How can "inscrutable" terms override the framers' unmistakable intention
to exclude suffrage? How can they curtail rights reserved to the states by
the tenth amendment, rights said by Madison to be "inviolable? '42 Respecting these reserved rights, the interpretive standard was furnished by
Chief Justice Marshall, in rejecting applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
states: "Had congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the several states . . . they would have declared
this purpose in plain and intelligible language., 43 In the Slaughter-House
Cases,' Justice Miller similarly declined to embrace a construction that
would subject the states' local concerns to the control of Congress "in the
absence of language which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of
34. L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S POWER
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975).
35. See generally Berger, Government by Judiciary.John HartEly's "Invitation," 54 IND.
L.J. 277, 304-08 (1979); Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism."Its Allure and Impossibility, 53
IND. L.J. 399, 446 (1978).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Ely, supra note 35, at 415.
Id at 416-18.
Berger, "Lawof the Land"Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 29 (1979).
4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962).
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 201-06 (1977).
41. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

98 (1980).

42. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 262 (J. Madison) (Tudor Publishing ed. 1947).
43. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
44. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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doubt. ' a
In fact, however, the terms are not "inscrutable." "Privileges and immunities" had throughout been associated with the rights of "trade and commerce" drawn from article IV and its antecedent in the Articles of
Confederation. 46 These rights had been carefully enumerated in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 as the rights to own property, to contract, and to have
access to the courts. Justices Bradley and Field recognized this early on,
and Chief Justice White later reiterated the point. 4 7 "Equal protection"
had been associated in the debates with those enumerated rights. 48 For
example, Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio said that "whatever rights as to
each of these enumerated civil (not political) matters the States may confer
upon one race. . . shall be held by all in equality. . . .It secures equality
of protection in those enumerated civil rights.",49 As Chief Justice Taney
stated, "The members of the Convention unquestionably used the words
they inserted in the Constitution in the same sense in which they used
them in their debates." 50
But, the activists maintain, words change their meaning over time, a
thinly-disguised claim of judicial power to revise the Constitution. Chief
Justice Taney emphasized, however, that "[i]f in this court we are at liberty
to give old words new meanings when we find them in the Constitution,
there is no power which may not, by this mode of construction, be con45. Id at 78.
46. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111 (7th ed. 1963). See Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review, " 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87, 103 (1981).
47. Justice Bradley held in 1870: "[The civil rights bill was enacted at the same session
and shortly before the presentation of the fourteenth amendment . .. [it] was in pari
materia; and was probably intended to reach the same object. . . the first section of the bill
covers the same ground as the fourteenth amendment." Live Stock Dealers & Butchers
Ass'n v. Cresent City Live Stock Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8,408).
Led by Justice Field, the fourt dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases asked: "What,
then, are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgment by State legislation?" 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872). They answered: "In the first section of the Civil
Rights Act Congress has given its interpretation of these terms. . .[which] include the right
to make and enforce contracts. . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property .
I..."
Id See also Chief Justice White's statement, in United States v.
Wheeling, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920), that "the Constitution plainly intended to preserve and
enforce the limitations as to discrimination imposed by Article IV of the Articles of Confereration. . . the text of Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution, makes manifest that it was drawn
with reference to the corresponding clause of the Articles of Conferation and was intended
to perpetuate its limitations . ..."
48. See generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) and SlaughterHouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
49. CONO. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866).
50. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 477 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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ferred on the general government and denied to the States."'" In this, he
echoed Madison: if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation. . . be not the guide in expounding it, there can be
no security . . . for a faithful exercise of its powers."52 This remained the
view of the Reconstruction Congress. In January, 1872, a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee, signed by senators who had voted for the fourteenth amendment, stated, "A construction which should give the phrase
a meaning different from the sense in which it was understood and
employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as
unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and expressed language of
the Constitution."5 3 The task of the interpreter, Justice Holmes wrote, is to
ascertain what the words meant to the writer and to effectuate that intention.54 Where that intention is manifest, Judge Learned Hand held, it
"overrides even the explicit words used."55 Men do not use words to defeat
their purpose. If the framers meant to conceal their purpose, they committed a fraud on the ratifiers. Of course, there is not a shred of evidence for
such a purpose.
"The new 'substantive equal protection,"' Professor Herbert Packer
justly affirmed, "has under a different label permitted today's Justices to
impose their prejudices in much the same manner as the Four Horsemen
once did."56 That reflects what John Stuart Mill considered the universal
"disposition of mankind . . . to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others," cautioning that it is restrained only
' In a revealing autobiographical disclosure, Justice
by "want of power." 57
Douglas wrote that "the 'gut' reaction of a judge at the level of constitutional adjudication, dealing with the vagaries of due process. . . and the
51. Id at 478.
52. 9 J. MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 191 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910),
quotedin R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (1977).
53. A. AVINS, Report of Jan. 25, 1872, in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DE-

BATES 571 (1967).
54. O.W. HOLMES, Theory of Legal Interpretation,in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 206
(1920). See also Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 74 (1905); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920). For a discussion of
Holmes' participation in these cases, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 377-84 (1977).
55. THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING, DECISIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND (H.
Shanks ed. 1968).

56. Packer, The Ams of the CriminalLaw RevisitedA Pleafora New Look at "Substan-

tive Due Process",44 S. CAL. L. REV. 490, 491-92 (1971).
57. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 28 (1885), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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like, was the main ingredient of his decision."58 Why should millions of
Americans prefer the "gut reaction" of some Justices against death penalties, for instance, to their own choice of death penalties? Judge J. Skelly
Wright, a devoted activist, pointed out that "the most important value
choices have already been made by the Framers of the Constitution" and
that judicial "value choices are only to be made within [those] parameters," implying that Justices may not supplant the framers' choices.5 9
The fundamental issue, then, is whether the people may govern themselves or whether they have surrendered self-government to a nonelected,
life-tenured, self-constituted set of Platonic Guardians. Like Charles Mcllwain, I believe that "the two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to
arbitrary power and a complete responsibility of the government to the
governed."6 Nothing in the Constitution or its history warrants the inference that, alone among the branches, the judiciary was given unlimited,
unaccountable power, checked only by judicial "self-restraint."

58. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 8 (1981).

59. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholary Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 769, 784-85 (1971). Justice Douglas also declared that "[tlhe choice was made by the
Framers. . . .The Framers made it a standard." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 178-79
(1952) (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. C. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 146 (rev. ed. 1947).

